Aims: To describe the implementation of safety systems for the use of intravenous potassium chloride in haematology patients. Methods: We assessed the use of intravenous potassium in a haematology ward at a tertiary hospital. Initially, we prospectively analysed the prescribing and administration of intravenous potassium to all patients over a two-week period. To complement this data, we retrospectively analysed all clinical incidents involving intravenous potassium and the dispensing patterns of potassium ampoules for the past 12 months. Drawing on evidence and recommendations from international safety literature, gaps in the safe use of potassium were identified, and a multi-factorial approach to system change was implemented. Results: A total of 18 patients were analysed with 90 intravenous bags of potassium prepared on the ward using 624 ampoules. We identified multiple opportunities for error and a lack of standardisation of therapy. The following safety systems were introduced: (i) a new prescribing and monitoring form that included dose calculation, prescriber support and pre-printed orders; (ii) removal of potassium ampoules and introduction of premixed bags; (iii) independent double checking by nursing staff at point of administration; (iv) dedicated labelling of intravenous lines; (v) extensive clinician training supported by guidelines; and (vi) introduction of 'smart pump' infusion software. The number of incidents significantly reduced from 23 to 9 (p < 0.001), and the number of ampoules dispensed reduced from 10,100 to 0. Conclusions: A multi-factorial approach to the safe prescribing, dispensing and administration of intravenous potassium has reduced the potential for patient harm in the haematology setting.
Introduction
Intravenous (IV) potassium chloride is considered a 'high-alert medication' by Medication Safety authorities throughout the world. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Significant patient harm can result from errors in the prescribing, preparation and administration of IV potassium. Harm can arise due to a rapid rate of change in serum potassium, usually due to rapid administration, which can be arrhythmogenic and potentially fatal. As the medical implications can be catastrophic, a variety of safety strategies to reduce the risk of harm have been proposed. 2, 4, 6 System analysis of medication use, in particular medication errors, has regularly demonstrated that the standardisation and simplification of medication use processes will reduce the number of adverse drug events. 7, 8 This means creating and following streamlined, clinically sound, uniform processes and models of care, thereby reducing variation and unnecessary complexity in the medication use process. Well-described techniques to reduce the risk of medication misadventure include reducing options for drug products and the standardisation of doses, administration times, rates and techniques. For example, using standard concentrations and volumes of high-alert medications, such as potassium, defines available options, reduces the number of complex dose calculations and preparation time, ultimately reducing the likelihood of an inadvertent error.
There are international recommendations for the correct use of IV potassium of which the most commonly used is simply the removal of undiluted potassium ampoules from the ward environment in a healthcare facility. The hypothesis is that by reducing the access to undiluted potassium, there is a correlated reduction in the risk of an inadvertent bolus dose administration and errors associated with preparing infusions. To meet safety standards, many clinical areas have introduced premixed potassium infusions and accompanying guidelines to direct the safe administration of IV potassium. In Australia, this is now a routine practice in general wards; [9] [10] [11] however, haematology units have often been overlooked as standard infusions do not meet complex patient needs. 12 Patients with haematological conditions, as a result of treatments and subsequent complications, are prone to a serious and acute depletion of potassium that warrants large amounts of potassium needing to be replaced. Unfortunately, due to substantial requirements, the effects of concomitant drugs such as amphotericin and the presence of side effects such as nausea, vomiting and mucositis of the gastrointestinal tract, the IV route is often the only route available. While many safety systems for IV potassium are described in a clinical setting, 6 little research exists that assesses the introduction of safety systems in the haematology setting.
Methods
To initiate the quality improvement process, we retrospectively analysed all medication incidents associated with IV potassium in the haematology ward that had been reported in the hospital's incident reporting system by clinical staff (nursing, pharmacy or medical) in the preceding 12 months. We used a traditional root cause analysis methodology to identify and understand the contributing factors that led to the incidents. In addition, we prospectively audited the use of IV potassium in the haematology ward for two consecutive weeks. The audit included: the number of IV infusions per patient; the amount (mmol) per bag, concentration (mmol/l) and administration rate (mmol/h) of each potassium infusion; and the number of ampoules used.
As this was considered a major patient safety improvement process, the initiative was governed by the organisation's peak patient safety body, chaired by the organisation's Chief Executive Officer, which reports directly to the organisation's Executive committee. A detailed implementation strategy was developed and led by a multidisciplinary working party who formally reported at regular intervals to the governing committee. The working party consisted of representatives essential to the success of the initiative and included staff from the haematology ward (medical, nursing and pharmacy staff), the organisation's Clinical Safety Unit (Clinical Safety and Medication Safety officers) and the organisation's Clinical and Corporate Risk Managers. The implementation strategy is diagrammatically summarised in Figure 1 .
Safety systems
Following the investigative phase, a number of safety systems were introduced. These systems included recommendations from a systematic review of the literature that outlined the best practices for the handling of products containing potassium. 6 Although published in 2005, the key recommendations match contemporary international standards 2,4,5 and are listed in Table 1 .
Analysis
After implementation of the new safety systems, the number of ampoules and premixed infusions dispensed to the ward and the number of reported clinical incidents was reviewed at 12 months, and results were compared to pre-implementation data. For the assessment of the clinical incidents, the Poisson probability density function was used to estimate the probability of seeing the change in incidence rates between pre and post-intervention periods. Analysis was conducted using R (2011) (R Development Core Team (2011). R: A language and 
Results

Assessment of current state
Prospective audit. A total of 18 patients were prescribed IV potassium on the haematology ward during the twoweek audit period. This equated to the preparation of 90 infusions by nursing staff using 624 ampoules. The median (range) amount of potassium per bag was 80 (20-240) mmol, the median (range) administration rate was 3.1 (0.8-10) mmol/h and the median (range) concentration was 80 (20-240) mmol/l. The prospective audit identified a number of elements that indicated that the process of IV potassium replacement is a significantly complex task, with many variations in work practice exposing staff to multiple opportunities for error. The identified elements included a wide range of concentrations for potassium admixtures-19 different concentrations were used during our audit; difficulty in determining actual potassium amounts being replaced over time; a complex, time-consuming process for the manufacture of bags of potassium in the clinical setting; concentrated ampoules readily available for inadvertent administration; an inability to efficiently calculate hourly potassium rates; little serum monitoring of potassium occurred; the majority of patients had a central line (suitable for the administration of high-dose potassium).
Incident analysis and ampoule usage.
A total of 23 incidents were reported in the 12 months (1 December 2009-30 November 2010) preceding the system changes (1.9 per month), and a total of 10,100 ampoules of concentrated potassium was used (841 per month). A breakdown of monthly results is presented in Figures 2 and 3 .
Intervention phase and introduction of safety systems
After undertaking the assessment of current state and understanding the problem, we considered the approach to begin with establishing the future state-knowing what we want to achieve, that is to 'reduce error rates of potassium administration by ensuring the process of potassium replacement is standardised, simple and meets the needs of the patient without adding further risk'. The safety systems introduced are presented in Table 1 . The most comprehensive system intervention was the design and introduction of a standardised prescribing, administration and monitoring form ( Figure 4 ) that incorporated multiple forcing functions to reduce the risk of medication errors. These functions included setting a maximum rate of potassium replacement, the availability of a single concentrated potassium solution (40 mmol/ 100 ml), serum potassium monitoring section and a more stable process for selecting the rate of infusion.
Post-implementation results
A total of nine incidents were reported in the 12 months following implementation of the system changes (0.75 per month). There were significantly fewer incidents in the post-implementation period compared to the pre-implementation period (23 vs. 9, p < 0.001). There were no ampoules used in the 12 months following the system changes. A description of the incident type is shown in Table 2 .
Discussion
Maintaining potassium homeostasis is a common dilemma in patients with severe haematological diseases. Often, large replacement requirements are necessary, and the oral route of administration is unavailable, which results in the use of IV potassium. This is considered a process with a high-risk for medication error, is time consuming for clinical staff and has the potential for patient harm. Inadvertent medication errors due to IV potassium can occur at any point of the medication use cycle; dispensing and product selection, prescribing, preparation of diluted solutions and administration. To counter the associated risks, global medication safety bodies from United States (US), 5 Canada 1 and the United Kingdom (UK) 4 have issued recommendations to prevent patient harm. Locally, the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care issued a high-risk medication alert for IV potassium in 2003. 2 The alert provided succinct recommendations for the safe use of potassium and tools to help hospitals action the recommendations.
The true incidence of potassium-related fatalities and incidents in the hospital setting is unknown; 11 however, examples of commonly reported errors and proposed solutions are described. 
Dispensing and product selection
A commonly reported error has been the inadvertent selection of a potassium ampoule instead of a sodium chloride 0.9% ampoule-classically described as a 'look-alike-sound-alike' error. 11 In this situation, the health-clinician inadvertently selects the incorrect ampoule (similar size and shape) and administers the potassium as a bolus injection, which can lead to patient harm. International case studies describing fatal outcomes have prompted changes to the storage of ampoules, for example the segregation of ampoules with a similar appearance to potassium. 11 Major safety bodies 2,4,5 have now taken the step of recommending the complete removal of concentrated potassium ampoules from the ward environment, and removal of ampoules is now considered an indicator of safety performance for hospitals. 10 However, a recent observational study in Australia of prescribing and administration practices for potassium revealed that while the removal of potassium ampoules has occurred in 'general' wards in most hospitals, it has not occurred in speciality areas, such as intensive care and haematology/oncology units. 12 Despite the release of a national safety edict in 2003, 2 the study estimated that 70,000 ampoules had been used in one year (2008) in Victorian (Australia) alone. 12 The sourcing of a pre-mixed potassium solution for our haematology unit enabled potassium ampoules to be removed reducing the risk of the inadvertent selection of potassium. In the rare instances that the use of ampoules would be necessary, they can only be accessed via a strict hierarchical approval system.
Prescribing and monitoring
Prescribers play a significant role in the safe use of IV potassium, and a major contribution to patient care can occur as pen is put to paper. Complexities of orders, nonstandardisation of prescriptions and lack of access to drugdosing information are regularly cited causes of medication misadventure. 8, 13, 14 Pre-mixed solutions should be the preferred order in the first instance and in a manner that facilitates their use rather than concentrated ampoules. Standardisation of prescribing reduces medication errors markedly, 8 and this has been seen in many high-risk drugs such as heparin, warfarin, cytotoxics and insulin, where dedicated forms are routinely used. In addition, the color coding of 'high-risk' aspects of forms alerts clinicians to complete the highlighted section accurately. In our study, we found that color-coding forms also ensured that forms were not photocopied (black and white). It is essential to reduce the number of complex dosecalculations as error rates are high when arithmetical calculations are required. 15 System analyses have revealed that a major cognitive challenge in prescribing is dosage calculation. Lesar et al. 16 reported that more than one in six prescribing errors involved miscalculation of dose, wrong decimal point placement or the incorrect expression of unit of measurement. Simple infusion dose calculators substantially reduce errors rates, 13, 15 and our pre-printed prescribing form was designed to help eliminate complex dose and rate calculations. In our case, medical staff could only select an administration rate from six options available that clearly identify the hourly/daily potassium dose each patient will receive (Figure 4) .
Accurate dose adjustment based on serum potassium is essential to ensure homeostasis in the patient. The prescription form clearly identifies the minimum frequency at which patient's serum potassium should be monitored. Clear working instructions for nursing and medical staff removed any ambiguity and ensured that all patients have potassium levels linked to the dose of potassium being administered.
Preparation
The Australian Commission has stated that the availability of potassium ampoules as medication stock in patient care areas was the root cause of many incidents. The Commission's leading recommendation was simply to 'replace concentrated ampoules with large-volume premixed solutions in general ward areas in acute care facilities'. 2 Since 2003, the use of IV infusions containing 'low-dose' potassium (20-40 mmol/l) has grown dramatically. 12 While these products are suitable for a typical patient, critical care units are unable to administer the large amounts of potassium required for their patients, in particular in fluid-restricted patients. This has often led to empirical replacement strategies for larger doses according to 'physician choice'. A recent study in the UK reported that 53 different IV potassium infusions were prepared in clinical areas in hospitals in the north of England. 17 In Australia, a multi-centre review of 1088 IV potassium administrations found 69 different types of orders for potassium that varied in either concentration or volume. 12 In our two-week audit, we saw 19 different solutions prepared.
As well as being time consuming for clinical staff, the inadequate mixing of potassium in IV diluents can lead to the 'pooling' of high concentrations of potassium and the potential for the rapid administration of potassium despite apparent dilution of the drug. 18, 19 A recent study 19 demonstrated that 'vigorous' mixing is required and that the infusions need to stand for 24 h to ensure homogeneity of the drug or electrolyte. This is not practical in a busy ward environment, and local infection control policies restrict this practice. Ideally, potassium infusions should be prepared and provided by the pharmaceutical industry in premixed bags. 6 An observational section of our audit (not described in this text) found that approximately 20 h per week could be saved if externally manufactured products were used.
Recently, a 40 mmol per 100 ml (sodium chloride 0.9%) solution has become available in Australia. This has offered an alterative to the preparation of solutions; however, many hospital sites are still reluctant to use these solutions in both general wards and the critical care setting. 12 The reasons for this appear to be fourfold: the risk of 40 mmol of potassium flowing freely if the IV burette or pump fails; the lack of cardiac telemetry in many wards; the need for the solution to be administered via a central line and the historical practice of prescribing the total daily amount of potassium in the one infusion bag, for example '160 mmol over 24 h'. Our extensive education campaign and clear work-processes have ensured that staff are confident and competent with using high-dose potassium infusions. At 12 months post-implementation at a total of 1214 (101 per month), premixed solutions had been used, indicating a good uptake of the new system.
Administration
The parenteral administration of drugs has the highest risk and severity of error than other routes of administration, 20 and errors associated with the administration of parenteral drugs in high-risk clinical areas are common. 21, 22 A recent multi-national study of 113 intensive care units across 27 countries demonstrated that parenteral errors at the administration stage are frequent and are a serious safety problem in ICUs. 21 Of the 1328 patients reviewed, 861 errors were reported in 441 patients, an incidence of 74.5 events per 100 patient days. 21 A study on 10 general wards in two hospitals in the UK revealed that one or more medication errors occurred in 49% of parenteral drug preparations and administrations. 22 The most common causes for these errors were a lack of perceived risk of error, poor role models and the availability of appropriate technology to assist with drug delivery. The most common error was a deliberate bolus administration of a drug that should be infused. No such incidents occurred during our study.
New pump technology designed to prevent administration errors is now commonly used in healthcare and has been shown to reduce the prevalence of parenteral administration errors. [23] [24] [25] These so-called smart pumps have drug-specific databases that set minimum and maximum limits around the concentration of the solution and the rate of administration. The datasets we developed included the potassium drug profiles being separated based on peripheral or central access and the addition of a clinical advisory alert, during programming of the pump, prompting the clinician that a central line must be used. More recently, the Australian Commission have released national standards for the labelling of administrations lines to prevent line confusion. 26 As such, we implemented the use of dedicated potassium stickers to label administration lines. Finally, the nursing staff implemented a safety checklist at the bedside that prompted an independent double check (two separate nurses) to ensure that the correct potassium dose was administered at the correct rate. The use of multiple 40 mmol bags instead of a high-dose infusion (e.g. 240 mmol) could potentially equate to an increase in nursing time, as more frequent changes in bags are required. However, in our study, the more frequent changes were seen as a positive by nursing staff as infusion lines, telemetry and pump settings were checked on a regular basis, thereby reducing the potential for patient harm. In addition, no time was spent preparing bags with multiple ampoules.
Other system changes
System changes are essential to reduce incidents with high-alert drugs such as potassium. [6] [7] [8] Using incident data, we identified a poor system for potassium use at our hospital; however, research suggests that to reduce the number of potassium-related errors, hospitals must go beyond investigating individual incidents and focus more on identifying and implementing effective, systembased improvements that are grounded in evidence of reasonable quality. 6 Implementation strategies have been well documented by a number of national health bodies in the UK, Canada, Australia and the US. The National Patient Safety Agency in the UK released their potassium alert in 2002 and accompanied this alert with extensive implementation guidelines. 4 A study postimplementation assessed the impact of the strategies in 207 clinical areas in 20 Trusts that were randomly selected in England and Wales. 27 A total of 19 of the Trusts had taken action; however, only one was fully compliant, indicating that perseverance at a local level was required. Issues associated with non-compliance were lack of storage for infusions, difficulties in dosing fluid restricted patients, continuity of supply from the manufacturer and lack of awareness by junior doctors. All these issues were individually addressed in our study. A number of other strategies have been used to reduce IV medication errors throughout the world including guidelines, 9 standardisation of processes, 13 education, 28, 29 calculation worksheets 28 and electronic support. 30 We have elected to combine the benefits of many systems to ensure that the risk of patient harm is diminished.
Limitations of the study
There are potential limitations to this study. Incident reporting is clinician driven, often time consuming and relies on the effort of staff to describe incidents in the local incident monitoring database. Studies have shown that this does not always reflect the true number of incidents that occur. 31 However, on the haematology ward, staff were empowered to report all IV potassium incidents during the study time; therefore, we are reasonably certain that all incidents were recorded. Despite a twoyear duration, a longer study may be warranted to determine the cultural effect of our interventions. However, at the time of publication, approximately 22 months after the system changes, feedback from clinical staff has been positive and all systems still remain. A large, prospective, multi-site study would be ideal. This would help determine if our interventions could be translated to other health facilities, quantify patient benefits in a large population and determine which interventions are most successful. Unfortunately, a study of this size was beyond the scope of our research.
The use of the standardised prescription form and set potassium concentration solution was limited to patients with central venous access. While this may include the majority of haematology patients, there are times when patients do not have central access, and as a consequence, the potential benefits of the form are limited to patients with a central line. As yet, no hard barriers have been conceptualised to completely prevent the inadvertent peripheral administration of high-dose potassium; however, we now have multiple barriers to significantly reduce the risk. The smart pumps have an alert to prompt the user that a central line is required; however, this relies on the correct potassium solution being selected from the database. We believe further development of IV access lines and administration sets to consider hard barriers in design may one day overcome this. We have had two incidents involving the peripheral administration of potassium secondary to the selection of the wrong product.
Finally, we lacked resources to collect and analyse the potassium requirements of every individual patient prescribed potassium over a 24-month period; therefore, patient numbers pre-and post-intervention, and the total amount of potassium used per patient was not quantified. As such, we were unable to calculate the incidence percentage per patient. Theoretically, a decrease in patients requiring potassium post-intervention may explain fewer incidents. This remains unknown, however, it should be noted that admission rates to the Haematology ward were similar during both phases of the study.
Conclusion
The introduction of safety systems for the dispensing, prescribing and administration of potassium in a busy haematology unit has resulted in complete elimination of IV potassium ampoules and a significant reduction in clinical incidents, suggesting a reduction in patient harm. Clinical staff have embraced the new prescription form and the use of premix bags, no longer needing to spend lengthy periods involved in the prescribing and preparation of potassium solutions.
